Target: app.plaky.com · Program: CAKE.com · Researcher: Suruur
The button opens https://app.plaky.com/data-receiver.html as a popup
— a real top-level window on the victim's plaky origin, so the write below lands in the
victim's actual localStorage (browser storage partitioning does not apply).
A crafted IFRAME_PARENT_MESSAGE is then posted into it. The receiver checks
only that id / slug / name keys exist —
no e.origin validation.
The victim opens https://app.plaky.com/payment/plans (e.g. from a billing
email) while not signed into any workspace. Plaky's root-domain router reads
USED_WORKSPACES and executes — with this page hosted at
:
The browser lands directly on this site's own page
(/hacked.html) — fully attacker-controlled. A full-fidelity Plaky login /
payment-card phishing page would be served here. The poisoned entry persists until site
data is cleared, so the redirect repeats on every future visit.
Control: with USED_WORKSPACES cleared, the same URL shows the normal login
redirect (/login?redirectUrl=%2Fpayment%2Fplans&feature=ACCESS_WS) — no attacker redirect.
"https://app.plaky.com".replace("app", SLUG) performs a
plain string replacement — a slug containing / breaks out of the hostname, and
the ? absorbs the /payment/plans suffix the app appends, so the
attacker controls the final host and path. All steps are client-side; no server
interaction, no credentials requested, nothing sent from Plaky to the attacker host.